

An Assessment of Socio-Economic Effects of Buhari's Policy of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Damaturu and Gujba Local Governments, Yobe State

¹, Raji, Rafiu Boye, Ph.D., ², Yakaka Abubakar, ³, Halima Ali, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science *Department of Political Science* *Department of Public Admin*
Yobe State University, Damaturu. *Yobe State University, Damaturu.* *Yobe State University, Damaturu.*

ABSTRACT

Yobe state and indeed North-East states have experienced devastating impacts of attacks from the Boko Haram insurgents since 2009. Natural disasters, wars, and crises usually led to large-scale destruction of life, properties, infrastructure, social, and cultural disruption. Disasters and their adverse effects set societies back by decades and leave them vulnerable to physical, social, and economic hardships. To rebuild the destructions, and rehabilitate the population of the affected communities the Federal Government of Nigeria, specifically the Buhari government enacted the policy of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and resettlement of the affected communities in the North East. This paper assessed the socio-economic effects of the policy in bouncing the communities back to their normal life. The research used both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis to conclude the research. It was discovered that reconstruction usually consumes huge resources that the FGN is willing to expend on the affected communities. After this research, large segments of the communities are yet to feel the impact of the policy. The NEDC created purposely to fulfill policy mandate is currently working at a beginner's pace hence it is yet to cover a noticeable ground. The paper recommends that the objectives of the policy should be squarely followed. Converging of resources from donor and developmental agency should be a top priority, so that lack of budgetary allocation will not be a deterrent to the reconstruction and rehabilitation intent.

KEY WORDS: Policy, insurgency, reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement

I. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria was acclaimed as the economic giant of Africa, but with low social and economic indicators, and the people in its North-East region are generally the poorest. Today the unrelenting violence and crisis of insurgency in north-eastern states of Nigeria, has resultantly affected more than 14.8 million people, especially, in Adamawa, Borno, and the Yobe States. Over 2 million people have fled their homes and 7 million are estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance according to Displacement Track Matrix (DTM) (2018). The security situation remains volatile, host community resources are being depleted as an estimated 3 million people are living in inaccessible areas for most of 2015, 2016 and part of 2017 with different categories of needs. Many people are trapped in conflict affected areas for fear of death and abduction, if they attempt to relocate, and many are missing, while the destruction of infrastructure and disruption of livelihoods have aggravated pre-existing low levels of access to education, health, and other social services. Christian Aid (CA) (2016) narrated that, boys are forcibly recruited by armed groups and thousands of women and girls have been subjected to sexual abuse, enslavement, while some have been used as suicide bombers. At the height of the insurgency in the North-East, the Boko Haram insurgents drove citizens that refused to pay allegiance to them from their homes and took control of such communities in parts of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States. Nevertheless, those communities in Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, and Yobe states that escaped major violent disruptions now host most of the Internally Displaced People (IDPs), which creates pressure on the meager resources available in the host communities. The implication of the above is that Boko Haram insurgency poses a critical threat to the national security and sustainability in Nigeria, which consequently led to massive destruction of property that eventually calls for reconstruction and rehabilitation of

the region. The government along with the various international organizations, including the World Bank and others have sprang to the region for reconstruction, rehabilitation and recovery. These have been on for some time, while the FGN launched the Buhari policy of reconstruction, rehabilitation, recovery, and humanitarian services to the people of the north east.

Statement of Problem and Justification of the Research: As a result of the devastating effects posed by the prolonged conflict in the northeast, the region has lost over 40,000 lives according to Council on Foreign Relations {CFR} (2017); while over 1.7 million people have fled their places of habitual residence International Organization for Migration {IOM} (2015), thereby making them IDPs. Significantly so many physical infrastructures were destroyed, disrupted, damaged along with social services which affect social cohesion among the population of Damaturu and Gujba areas. Economic and social activities in the areas have been significantly disrupted, and fear of mistrust among the population are widespread. To return the region to normalcy, Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) alongside some development partners are putting collaborative efforts in making sure that peace is restored and the damaged communities rebuilt. The FGN taking a leading role along with other international institutions principally the World Bank, European Union, and others in this regards, develop workable strategies and initiated a special intervention package to accelerate the socio-economic development of the states; develop social cohesion and commitment to peace, under the auspices of the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation policy. Yobe state was one of the worst-hit states with several numbers of casualties and destructions. The insurgents' activities have displaced a large number of people in the state, according to a recent statistic by {DTM} (2018), Yobe state has the third-largest number of IDPs in the region with 136,662 out of which 91% IDPs lives with the host communities and only 9% recognized in established camps. This has severe effects on the households living conditions, especially in terms of shortages of food, water, healthcare, and accommodations, thus, a course for concern. It is on the backdrop of this, that this paper is geared towards assessing the socio-economic effects of the policy on the vulnerable groups of people in the selected LGAs. The research is justified on the basis that correct identification of the situation on the ground is necessary for a workable project to be executed. The level of destruction on the social fabric and cordial coexistence required a thorough investigation which the research intended to carry out. This it's believed will guide the types of projects for reconstruction and rehabilitation endeavor that will be considered for execution. The research will be hinged on the facts that correct assessment of a challenging situation will yield a beneficial result that will benefit the communities.

II. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main aim of the study is to assess the socio-economic effects of reconstruction and rehabilitation policy on internally displaced persons in Damaturu and Gujba local government areas of Yobe state. The study will also focus on;

1. How is the reconstruction policy affects the displaced persons in the two selected LGAs
2. Understanding the mode of post-conflict recovery and relevant inter-relationships, and
3. Presenting the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the selected LGAs to understand the effects of the policy on the inhabitants of the communities.

This will involve studying;

The socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the communities,

Shelter provision problems and the possibility of improving the livelihood of the returnees.

1. Literature Review

2. Concept of conflict and conflict resolution

Conflict is common in social life and is an inevitable part of living. It is related to questions and situations of scarce resources, a division of functions, power relations, and role-differentiation. Because of its pervasive nature, the concept has acquired a multitude of meanings and connotations presenting us with nothing short of a semantic jungle. Raji opines that:

Conflict generates considerable ambivalence and left many scholars and administrators quite uncertain about its meaning, relevance, and how best to cope with it and this has been the bane of successful resolutions of many conflicts, *including the North East conflict and the accompanying insurgency* (2019: 18).

Conflict has been a feature of human history and has shaped civilizations. It emerges from political differences and ideological divides between religions and ethnicities. Conflicts among societies and people also arise from failed political institutions resulting in poor governance, lack of political and social justice, accountability and transparency of the government, corruption, abuse of political power and high levels of poverty. These

deficiencies in governance have resulted in civil war that threatened the stability of states. Conflicts also arise due to clash of interests over national values among states, groups of states, organizations, organized groups (such as rebel and insurgent group) who are ever so aggressive to uphold their views and interests and always determined to win their cases. Thus, conflicts have become transnational in nature and its actors have challenged state authority through such method as alliance with other international rebel groups for information, intelligence, arms and financial supports. Such is the case of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East Nigeria. At another level, nature-based causes such as climate change has further contributed to conflicts among humans. These varying forms of conflicts leave societies destroyed with long and lasting adversarial impacts on the lives of people. Conflict may be taken to mean "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals" (Coser, 1956:7). Mack and Snyder (1957:7) suggest that the term refers to a range of empirical phenomena which can be identified or characterized by four conditions: the existence of two or more parties, a situation of resource or position scarcity, the presence of behavior that is designed to hurt or injure the other, and mutually opposed goals. These properties offered by Mack and Snyder as the necessary empirical conditions for the existence of conflict may exist within and among individuals, groups or nations. Accordingly, one can, therefore, speak of interpersonal, intergroup, intra-national, interstate, and international conflicts. We can also speak of conflict within or between parties, institutionalized and non-institutionalized conflict or conflicts between equal and asymmetric parties, such as those existing between the Government of Nigeria and the insurgent group traumatizing the communities in the Northeast.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) sees conflicts as:

The use of armed forces between the military forces of two or more governments, or of one government and at least one organized armed group, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1000 people in any single calendar year and in which the incompatibility concerns control of government and/or territory (cited in Trevor, 1996: 76).

The above definition was reinforced by the Uppsala Conflict Database (UCD) as put forward by Wallenstein and Sollenberg (2002). They argued about the place of power struggle and territorial expansion as part of the defining element of armed conflict. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIC) emphasizes conflicts as:

... the clashing of interests (positional differences) on national values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties (organized groups, states, groups of states, organizations) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their cases (HIIC, 2005: 2).

Against the above background, the Boko Haram insurgency could be regarded as fitting the above definitions provided, for (i) it is a conflict between a sitting government (FGN) and an organized armed group (the Boko Haram). (ii) They attempted to occupy the Nigeria territories in 2013 to 2015 many part of Nigerian territories were occupied by the Boko Haram in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states. In addition to these they demanded that equity in governance and full implementation of Sharia Laws should be the guiding principle of the North-east states. (iii) In some occasions, they demanded for a complete autonomy from the greater Nigeria and tens of thousands of deaths have occurred in the past eleven years of the outbreak of the insurgents.

The insurgency and its implication on the communities: Insurgencies are not new in the history of states and societies. The occurrence of insurgency according to Fafowora (2013: 2) go back to times of antiquity, as far back as the old civilizations of the Greek city states and the Roman Empire when the rulers of these ancient civilizations often had to face the challenge of insurgencies, insurrections and revolts. In modern history, examples of insurgencies and terrorism go back to at least four centuries, spanning many continents and states. These include the French revolution of 1789 that replaced the Bourbon monarchy by a new French Republic, and the 1776 American war of independence from British colonial rule. The 19th century was an even more unstable and turbulent era during which German unification was brought about by force under Chancellor Bismarck. The unification of Italy was also achieved by force under the leadership of Garibaldi. In the Balkans, the old Habsburg Empire was overthrown by a series of insurgencies including the murder at Sarajevo of Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serb nationalist. Insurgency has probably been the most prevalent form of violent conflict since the creation of organized political communities. According to (Hellesten, 2008), who describes insurgency as

A strategy adopted by groups either unable or unwilling to attain political objectives through normal means"... the central issue in insurgencies is political *and economic* power, and consequently, each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. Insurgents on their part, they use all available tools

political..., informational, including appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs, military, and economic to overthrow the existing authority (Hellesten. 2008:3).

Powell & Abraham (2006), emphasizes that,

Insurgency as a violent move by a person or group of persons to resist or oppose the enforcement of law or running of government or revolt against constituted authority of the state or of taking part in insurrection.

Which means that the destruction and audacity being witnessed resulting from Boko Haram's attacks is not new to insurgents' activities. Insurgency is an aspect of conflict that join the government with an organized group in combat that are usually difficult to disentangle. Lammers (2017) defines insurgency as "a violent challenge to a sovereign regime with the aim of achieving political change by the insurgents". Guide to Analysis of insurgency (2012: 4) defines insurgency as:

A protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.

Insurgency, term historically restricted to rebellious acts that did not reach the proportions of an organized revolution. It has subsequently been applied to any such armed uprising that typically has guerrilla in character, against the recognized government of a state or country. A study of the Boko Haram insurgency has intended to at least occupy some of the Nigeria territories, it intended to restructure some policies and laws of the nation.

According to United States' Central Intelligent agency (2009:2) insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organization and/or religious doctrines. Such unconstitutional struggle is usually internal and cause tremendous implication to the country's external relationship. For example, Powell and Abraham 2006 stated that:

When it constitutes an attack on defenseless citizens and other property resulting into injuries, loss of lives and properties as well as forced or massive internal displacement of people out of their habitual places of residence. When it drives business/investors away from an insecure area and also when it constitutes domestic and international crimes punishable by law such as treasonable felony, terrorism, murder, crimes against humanity and genocide, *and most especially, when they attack international institutions' interests.*

For instance, the insurgents claimed the attack on the police headquarters in Abuja, which was followed by another attack on the United Nations building in the Federal Capital city of Nigeria. All these cost Nigeria the sympathy of the international community, however, major international powers view the incidence as a negligence from the authority. Hence, they tactically denied Nigeria access to modern sophisticated weapon which could be used to fight the insurgents' group. The insurgency world over always have devastating effects on the communities where they operate.

The implications of the insurgency are the threat to national as well as international security, economic destruction, infrastructural destruction, and dislocation of local and national economic development, displacement of the population of the affected communities, disruption of education and learning processes of the areas that experience insurgency. As a result, the government is unable to find a quick and effective solution to restore peace as well as reconstruction, resettlement, and rehabilitation of the population affected by the insurgent to the original places of habitation. The resultant eruption of insurgency in the North-East has led many people to desert their places of primary habitation, where most have become destitute in their areas of sojourn, begging for what to eat and other livelihood needs. However, the Presidential initiatives whose interests and responsibilities are load in the creation of the NEDC: to ensure livelihood, resettlement, and reconstruction of the communities destroyed by the insurgency.

The true cost of insurgency: Research by the Oxfam and Safeworld organizations (2007) estimates that Africa loses around \$18bn per year due to wars, civil wars, and insurgencies. According to the research; on average, "armed conflict shrinks an African nation's economy by 15 percent, and this is probably a conservative estimate. The real costs of armed violence to Africans could be much, much higher". The costs came about in a variety of ways. There are the obvious direct costs of armed conflicts, medical bills, military expenditure, the destruction of infrastructure, and the costs for reconstruction, also the care for displaced people, which divert money from more productive uses. The indirect costs from lost opportunities are even higher. Economic activity falters or grinds to

a halt. Income from valuable natural resources ends up lining individual pockets rather than benefiting the communities of the country. The country suffers from inflation, debt, and reduced investment, while people suffer from unemployment, lack of public services, and trauma and psychosocial syndrome. More people, especially women and children, suffer most die from the fall-out of conflict than dies from the crisis itself. 'Boko Haram generally interprets to mean 'Western education is sinful'. It therefore, attempted to destroy the education structure in Yobe and other neighboring states. Raji (2017: 363), narrated that:

The insurgents have targeted schools, students/pupils, their teachers and the communities hosting schools for attacks. These have resulted in the destruction of several schools in State. The numbers of schools affected by the activities of the insurgency are enormous, but the most devastating among them, are attacks carried out in the Government Secondary Schools of Damaturu, Mamudo, and Government Science Secondary Schools in Potiskum. In the same vein, the insurgent dastardly attacked Federal Government College Buni Yadi, the College of Agriculture in Gujba among others.

The rate at which schools have being attacked drew the attention of Governor Ibrahim Gaidam, who also suffered distress as a results of the incessant and sporadic attacks on the educational sector in the state. The governor complained that the state suffered the most school-based casualties with over 120 students killed across schools in the state. Accounting for the losses of property and resources, he points out that:

Public buildings and facilities worth ₦7 billion were destroyed, while private property and assets worth over ₦7.4 billion were also destroyed during the mayhem. Other destruction includes 1,098 classrooms and 4,209 rooms from the health facilities, 5,162 assorted vehicles and 109,267 livestock were all destroyed (The Nation, May 2016).

Hence, when we talk of the cost in terms of lives, several lives of young lads and students were lost to the insurgency. Even though the above estimate are superficial the actual amount cannot be determined.

Other cost include the cost of reconstruction, rehabilitation and resettlement of the communities in the North-East region.

1. Expenditure on army formation,
2. Cost of purchases of arms and ammunitions,
3. Losses from local, state, and federal economy production,
4. Loss of employment,
5. Loss of lives and properties,
6. Cost incurred in the reconstruction of damaged communities,
7. Losses from retardness of education in the affected communities and beyond, etc.

Conclusively the true cost of insurgency cannot be truly estimated. The losses from the insurgents are losses to the community.

Post insurgency reconstruction and rehabilitation: There needs for post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation is an undeniable aspect of post-conflict recovery, if a community will made to bounce back. Many of the inhabitants of the insurgents affected communities have lost their sources of income and means of sustainability. It is now down on the Federal, State, and Local government, including international donor agencies to facilitation the reconstruction of the insurgents damaged communities. The concept of managing and accessing post-conflict reconstruction and development projects according to internationally-accepted project management processes is a relatively new and developing field (Lukic, 2010). As results of this, no standard processes has yet developed for the assessment of post-conflict reconstruction. However, Yin (2003) proposed the case study method which provided a systematic way to investigate the current approach practically and offered the researchers meaningful and applicable characteristics of the situation. In the same vein Tzifaki (nd) opines that:

Post-conflict reconstruction is broadly understood as a complex, holistic and multidimensional process encompassing effort to simultaneously improve military (restoration of law and order), political (governance), economic (rehabilitation and development) and social conditions (justice and reconciliation). The economic dimension of post-conflict reconstruction usually involves tasks such as distribution of relief assistance, restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, reestablishment of social services, creation of appropriate conditions for the private sector development, and implementation of essential structural reforms for macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth. Thus, there above captured most of the intention of the President Buhari's policy of reconstruction and rehabilitation in the North-East Nigeria. The most important policy in regard to the North-East reconstruction and rehabilitation is the creation of the North-East Development Commission, which was directed to take over activities of other similar agencies, such as PINE, PCNI. Part of activities of the NEDC including the following: The NEDC among other things, is to receive and manage funds from allocation

of the Federal Account and international donors for the settlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction of roads, houses and business premises of victims of insurgency as well as tackling menace of poverty, illiteracy level, ecological problems and any other related environmental or developmental challenges in the North-East states (the NEDC act, 2019).

In line with the policy of the FGN stated above, Fischer, mentioned that Post-conflict reconstruction usually aims at the consolidation of peace and security and the attainment of sustainable socio-economic development in a war-shattered country. The term 'post-conflict' does not signify the obliteration of the root causes of the outbreak conflict in the first place. Nor does it imply a complete cessation of hostilities that often recur.... It frequently denotes merely an abatement of hostilities, or a 'window of opportunity' for peace in a conflict that can again escalate if mismanaged (2004, 2-3).

Hence in his contribution to issues of reconstruction, Fukuyama argues: Reconstruction requires rapid, massive outside intervention to stabilize conflicts, rebuild infrastructure, and deal with humanitarian issues. The local government, he explains, is, by definition, unable to provide these functions itself, and...is often completely bypassed as foreign ... aid agencies, and NGOs flood into the country (Fukuyama 2006: 7).

This is the story of Nigeria's North-East region, for since 2011, the International and local NGO have flooded the theater of the insurgency in the North- East doing *God knows* assistance that has yet hit the nail on the head, for what we see as lack of direction and coordination from the Federal authority. In addition to the above stated definitions and descriptions of post-conflict reconstruction, Robin (2013), also described post-conflict reconstruction as: The rebuilding of the socioeconomic framework of society" and the "reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law." It is noted that post-conflict reconstruction is a process of rebuilding war-affected communities and 'includes the process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict. It also includes addressing the root causes of the conflict and promoting social and economic justice as well as putting in place political structures of governance and the rule of law in order to consolidate peace building, reconciliation and development.' This entails delivering social and economic development, providing governance and the rule of law including justice and reconciliation and longer-term development assistance (Robin, 2013: 29)

Post- conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation is the process of developing a long-term programmer usually designed for improving the economic wellbeing of the affected societies and people, and also develop institutions that can deliver governance, political and economic stability. The North East conflicts that begin in 2009, has cause a lot of destructions that requires substantive intervention to achieve stability. (DTM, 2019) has variously observed that; in Africa vast majority of IDPs do not live in camps or settlements areas, rather they stay with families or on their own in host communities, which also become affected by displacement and thus, constitutes additional challenges. Hence, support for such communities should not only focus on humanitarian aid, but also on developmental initiatives to strengthen basic infrastructure, services as well as increase food security and the availability of shelter and housing; measures that that aimed at benefitting the host communities at the same time helping IDPs. In this instance, Raju (2013), observed that conflict recovery is considered to be one of the least understood aspects of disaster risk management. Disaster and recovery according to Smith and Wenger (2007, 237) is "the differential process of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, social, economic, and natural environment through preventive planning and post-event actions". This description emphasizes that recovery is a process shaped by several conditions before and after the crisis/disaster. During recovery, the rebuilding environment must be closely linked to the social aspects of a community. Although physical reconstruction is an important component of the process, it is not the only one as recovery is also a social process. One important feature that usually thought of as aiding reconstruction is relocating the communities affected by conflict. However, greater importance is attached to the cultural values of a community and its continuity during post-disaster reconstruction or relocation. Oliver-Smith (1991) writes in the last decade of 20th century, that the relocation of communities depends on their will to move to a new environment, which depends on several factors related to political, socio-cultural and economic dimensions in society. During this period, relocation can be an instigator of social conflict in the region. It is not only costly to relocate an entire community, but it also changes the entire social pattern of the community. Resistance to relocation also arises because of fear of loss of "social and cultural identities". Better results are obtained when a holistic view is taken in post-disaster reconstruction, including incorporating people's points of view in planning and implementation.

The participation of individuals is an important issue in an effective disaster recovery programme. During disaster recovery, livelihoods and housing are two sectors of prime importance from a policy maker's perspective. According to Chambers and Conway (1992), sustainable livelihoods can be understood as "that which comprises


the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, claims, and access) and activities required for a means of living: a livelihood is sustainable if it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain and enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and contributes net benefits to the other livelihoods at the local and global levels in the long and short term. For instance, a UNDP (2005) reported that the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) policy has effectively worked in Sri-Lanka as a major livelihood plan for recovery after the Tsunami disaster of 2004. The policy has placed people at the center of designing a livelihood programme for various outcomes. This underlines the importance of community participation in decision making concerning livelihood. Such decisions are based on historical patterns of decision making concerning that community's culture. Lack of respect and consideration for a community's social and cultural values leads to the failure of many reconstruction programs. It is, therefore, important to give due consideration to cultural and other practices of the communities to ensure the sustainability of interventions undertaken as part of post-disaster reconstruction. In other words, recovery includes "strengthening community institutions and organizations and infrastructures and by diversifying livelihoods and the social capital is formed thus the communities will not only come back but will equally leap forward. Longley, Christoplos, and Slaymaker (2003) suggest that the culture of prevention and rights-based approaches as a policy narrative that may promote sustainable livelihoods which bring disaster and development closer.

The FGN commences a programme of reconstruction in north-eastern Nigeria vigorously since the coming of the President Buhari. The presidency inaugurated a committee saddled with the responsibility of assessing the immediate needs of the region, PCNI has since commenced operation. The main agenda of the committee according to the working document (the Buhari Plan, volume 1, 2016): Returning the region to normalcy is one of the highest priorities of the Nigerian Government. Achieving this will require bringing an end to the war, effectively handling the humanitarian crisis and implementation of an effective rehabilitation and resettlement programme. It will require the implementation of a solid peace-building, reconciliation, and de-radicalization framework; as well as the effective reconstruction of social and physical infrastructure. These were necessary to calm the situation to allow easy access to the region for meaningful reconstruction, rebuilding, and rehabilitation to take place. Targeted actions should, however, include mass renovation of homes destroyed by the insurgents and some through counter-insurgency collateral damages, thus, the plan *ceteris paribus* aimed to "Build sustainable economic communities per state, fast-track repair, reconstruction and completion of critical federal roads, rehabilitation of state roads, connecting rural roads to agricultural clusters the water, sanitation and hygiene initiative". The most important requirement must also include the rebuilding of social capital. Raji (2017), argues that inhabitant of insurgents' ravaged-communities in Yobe state have experienced severe shock that might make them remain vulnerable for a long time. He, therefore, urged that the communities' social capital should equally be rebuilt as a foundation for rapid transformation. Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum & Pfefferbaum (2008), found that social capital comprised network structures and linkages; social support; and community bonds, and commitments. It must also aim at bouncing the communities, not only back to their formal stage of development, but bounce forward. In line with this Raji (2017), identifies seven requirements that need adequate and immediate action if reconstruction and rebuilding activities are to be achieved, these include; peace and security, food, shelter, livelihood, health sectors, social system, and road network.

This research shall be grounded on Post-conflict reconstruction theory; which is understood as a complex, holistic and multidimensional process encompassing efforts to simultaneously improve security and military (restoration of law and order), political (governance), economic (rehabilitation and development) and social conditions (justice and reconciliation). The economic dimension of post-conflict reconstruction usually involves tasks such as the distribution of relief assistance, restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, the reestablishment of social services, creation of appropriate conditions for the public and private sector development, and implementation of essential structural reforms for microeconomic stability and sustainable growth.

III. METHODOLOGY; DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA/SITE/SUBJECTS, DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS:

The study is empirical, it, however, uses both secondary and primary sources of data, and data were be generated from a field survey.



A map showing the two LGAs, Damaturu and Gulani.

IV. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

In the case of quantitative analysis data generated were quantitatively analyzed using Chi-square statistical tools, this help the researcher in testing the relationship between the variable. The statistical tools also help the researcher in understanding and knowing the relationship between the variables under investigation. It also help the researcher in accepting the result or rejecting the result after testing the hypothesis.

Table 1: Portraying the Nature of Conflict in Damaturu and Gujba Local Government

Source: Field work 2020

Table 1: indicates that the nature of the conflict in the two local government is insurgency, which has led to

	Host communities	IDPs	Response mechanisms	Total
YES= 229/267=0.85	0.85x99= (84.15)	0.85x91= (77.35)	0.85x77= (65.45)	229
NO= 38/267=0.14	0.14x99= (13.86)	0.14x91= (12.74)	0.14x77= (10.78)	38
TOTAL	99	91	77	267

destruction of many communities, and also it has led to displacement of many individual from their place of resident to IDPs Camp as disclosed by 229 respondents. In regard to measures to curtail the phenomenon 38 respondents unveiled that no measures were put in place to remedy the condition.

Table 1: Showing the Chi-square Table

O	E	O-E	O-E ²	(O-E/E) ²
84	84.15	0.15	0.022	0.00026
79	77.35	1.65	2.75	0.035
66	65.45	0.55	0.30	0.0045
15	13.86	1.14	1.59	0.114
12	12.74	0.74	0.54	0.042
11	10.78	0.22	0.048	0.0044

Source: Field work 2020

DF=(C-1) (r-1)
= (3-1) (2-1)
=2(1)
=0.05 =5.991

Table 2: The Policy on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the Two Local Government

	Plan or Policy on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation	Provision of Social Services	Reconstruction of Damaged Structures	Total
	No	Yes	No	Yes
DAMATURU	54	8	13	8
GUJBA	30	3	5	5
Total	84	11	18	1

Source: Field work 2020

Table 2: indicates that 84 respondents are not aware of any plan or policy on reconstruction and rehabilitation while 11 respondents agreed that they are aware of the policy on reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, 80 of the respondents disagree that the policy on reconstruction and rehabilitation is main to improve the livelihood of the affected communities, while 17 respondents agree that policy has improve the livelihood of the affected communities, 62 respondents disagree that there is a plan and the policy for the reconstruction and the rehabilitation of the communities, while 13 respondents agree that there is a plan of the commission in their communities. Here it is clear that understood that people in the communities are not even aware of the commission, and there is no plan or policy to improve their livelihood in that affected community's.

Table 3: Showing the Policy on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the two Local Government

	Plan or Policy on Reconstruction and Rehabilitation	Provision of Social Services	Reconstruction of Damaged Structures	Total
NO= 226/267=0.84	71 (69.92)	77 (75.60)	78 (78.96)	226
YES= 38/267=0.14	12 (12.45)	13 (13.50)	16 (14.10)	41
TOTAL	83	90	94	267

Source: Field work 2020

Table 2: indicates that there is no ongoing plan or policy on reconstruction and rehabilitation in the two affected local government, this is because 71 of the respondents are of the opinion that there is no ongoing plan or policy on reconstruction and rehabilitation in the two affected local government. However, 77 of the respondents also disclosed that there is no ongoing plan for the provision of social services for the affected communities in the two local government. Again, 78 respondents disagree that there is a policy on reconstruction of the damaged structures in the two local government. Contrary to the above opinion 12 of the respondents agree that there is ongoing plan or policy on reconstruction and rehabilitation in the two affected local government. In addition to the above argument 13 of the respondents agree that there is ongoing plan for the provision of social services for the affected communities in the two local government. Similarly, 16 of the respondents agree that there is a policy on reconstruction of the damaged structures in the two local government.

Table 3: Showing Chi Square Table

O	E	O-E	O-E ²	(O-E/E) ²
71	69.72	1.28	1.63	0.020
77	75.6	1.40	1.96	0.025
78	78.96	-0.96	0.92	0.01
12	12.45	-0.45	0.20	0.016
13	13.50	-0.50	0.25	0.018
16	14.10	1.9	3.61	0.25
Total				0.34

Source: Field work 2020.

$X^2=0.34$

$DF=(C-1)(r-1) = (3-1)(2-1) = 2(1) = 0.05 = 5.991$

Testing of hypothesis 1

The above table3 indicates that, the X^2 calculated is 0.20 while the X^2 tabulated under 0.05 level of significance under DF2 is 5.991. Hence, since the X^2 calculated is higher than the X^2 tabulated we reject the null hypothesis which stated that there is no significant relationship between the insurgency and socio-economic effect of Buhari's policy on reconstruction and rehabilitation on the internally displaced persons. Here the chi-square is used to test the significant relationship between the insurgency and Buhari's policy of reconstruction and rehabilitation on the internally displaced persons if two affected local government.

Testing of hypothesis 2

The above table (2) indicates that, the X^2 calculated is 0.34 while the X^2 tabulated under 0.05 level of significance under DF2 is 5.991. Hence, since the X^2 calculated is higher than the X^2 tabulated we reject the null hypothesis which stated that there are no significant differences between the Buhari's policy on reconstruction and rehabilitation on the internally displaced persons and the ongoing plan for the provision of social services to the affected communities in the two local government. Here the chi-square is used to test the significant differences between Buhari's policy and the provision of social services to the affected communities in the two local government.

Decision (1) X^2 calculated is 0.20 while the X^2 table at DF 0.2 @ 0.05 level of significance is 5.991 since the X^2 calculated is greater than the X^2 tab, the Null hypothesis is hereby rejected, and the alternate hypothesis is accepted.

Decision (2) X^2 calculated is 0.34 while the X^2 table at DF 0.2 @ 0.05 level of significance is 5.991 since the X^2 calculated is greater than the X^2 tab, the Null hypothesis is hereby rejected, and the alternate hypothesis is accepted.

Computation of Expected Value in Damaturu under Insurgency

	Insurgency	IDPs	Remedy to Conflict
YES= 84/98=0.85	0.88 (30)	0.88 (33) (2.04)	0.88 (32) (28.16)

	(26.40)		
NO=11/95=0.11	0.11 (30)	0.11 (33)	0.11 (32)
	(3.30)	(3.63)	(3.52)

Source: Field work 2020

Computation of Expected Value in (Gujba under Insurgency)

	Insurgency	Policy on the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation	Socio-Economic and Culture
NO		0.82 (34)	0.82 (32)
=80/97=0.82	0.82 (31)	(27.88)	(26.24)
	(25.42)		
YES	0.17 (31)	0.17 (34)	0.17 (32)
=17/97=0.17	(5.27)	(5.78)	(5.44)

Source: Field work 2020

Computation of Expected Value in the Two Local Government

	Insurgency	Policy on the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation	Socio-Economic and Culture
NO=	0.84x83=	0.84x90= (75.6)	0.84x94= (78.96)
226/267=0.84	(69.72)		
YES=	0.15x83=	0.15x90= (13.50)	0.15x94= (14.10)
41/267=0.14	(12.45)		

Source: Field work 2020

V. CONCLUSION

It can be said that the activities of Boko Haram constitute a serious threat to the development of Nigeria. Aside the socio-economic implications, the human cost is of great concern to everybody in Nigeria. Thousands of people have been displaced due to the persisted attacks from the dreaded Islamic sect called Boko Haram. The government should wake up from its slumber and end the insurgency for once. The nation cannot continue to lose its citizens on a daily basis from Boko Haram coordinated bombings. It is time to put an end to terrorism in Nigeria and every Nigerian should have the freedom to live in any part of the country without the fear of being attacked by anybody. Finally, this study was based on quantitative research on the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on the socioeconomic situations in the northeast of Nigeria. It further concluded that since the coming of the insurgent sect in the country, it is observed that women and children live have been had shaken. The negative impact of the insurgent group has brought a physical, psychological social and economic harm to Nigeria's social and economic development. Based on the above study, it is concluded that the Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern Nigeria has crippled social economic, activities as well as security. Several women have turned to widows, children to orphans, numerous families have become destitute, family ties/bonds broken, many others have become traumatized widows and orphans, many millionaires have been demoted to houseboys, beggars and refugees several enterprises have distorted tens of thousands of lives lost in addition to those eternally disabled and traumatized, abandoned and or uninhibited offspring. Likewise, children born and grownup to mothers in such expressive mayhem are more disposed to difficulties and more likely to grow as adults with psychiatric syndromes. Finally, the activities of the sect have distressing, many communities have become immigrants in their own state; hamlet and homes are demolished by the insurgent's group and nothing was done to reconstruct and rehabilitate the affected communities.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

- From the available findings, the study recommends that Nigerian government should provide good plan and policies that would assist in reconstruction and rehabilitation of the affected communities. In addition to the above there is need for free and compulsory education in the northeastern region especially those two local government under investigation, up to university level.
- Government should also make a plan and provision for good and services for the affected communities
- All the three tiers of government should take part in reconstruction of the damaged structures.
- NGOs NEDC, should partake in reconstruction and rehabilitation of the destroyed structures.
- The federal and States governments should immediately commence reconstruction of all destroyed schools and provide necessary teaching facilities to the schools to encourage people to continue with their education.

- The government should provide special economic intervention programmes, bail out and fund to the affected states and areas hit by the insurgency.
- There is a need for special rehabilitation and trauma centers in the affected states, especially for women and children who have had terrible knowledge during the insurgency period.
- All trauma visible persons should be given a special mental examination action to avoid and contain possible post-traumatic stress and disorder (PTSD).
- There is a need to provide adequate security to all targeted places like schools, mosques, churches, market police stations among others.
- The Nigerian government needs to initiate policy that will generate employment for the army of unemployed youths in the country.
- Reports from the battlefield indicate that security personnel are not being provided with modern fighting equipment. The government should endeavor to supply the army with sophisticated military equipment.

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